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Kaartje 
Study Area  
South Africa’s fisheries yields 
peaked in the 1960s and 
1970s, but since then many 
stocks have declined due to 
over-exploitation.  Although the 
commercial fishing industry 
has historically been 
dominated by a few white-
owned companies, following 
the end of apartheid new 
policies were introduced to 
rectify this inequitable 
distribution of fishing 
opportunities and  improve the 
sustainability of fisheries. 
While the fisheries sector only 
accounts for 0.5% of GDP, 
access to fisheries resources 
can be critical for local 
livelihoods. This is particularly 
the case in South Africa’s 
Western Cape, where most of 
the country’s small-scale, non-
white fisheries are. 
Commercial exploitation also 
has a strong presence here: 
this region’s fisheries account 
for around 90% of the total 
national fisheries value. Three 
fishing communities in the 
Western Cape are the focus of 
this study: Hawston/Hermanus, 
Kalk Bay and Ocean View. 
Overview 
 
At the end of the apartheid era, the need to profoundly change 
South Africa’s economy and society became the focus of 
government policy.  A key part of this transformation involved 
redistributing resources more equitably amongst the 
country’s different demographic groups.  Although access to 
fishing rights was not officially affected by apartheid, the 
political system limited non-whites’ ability to acquire 
sufficient capital or expertise to enter the fishing sector or 
make full use of rights.  In 1994, less than 1% of the ‘Total 
Allowable Catch’ (TAC) for commercial fisheries was allocated 
to ‘historically disadvantaged persons’ (HDPs) of black and 
coloured origin.  With the coming of democracy, HDPs sought 
greater access to fisheries resources.  However, changes to 
the rights allocation system, which were intended to 
transform the fishing industry, have caused mistrust and 
dissatisfaction among many fishers.  Declines in key stocks, 
in conjunction with small quota sizes and altered access 
rights have contributed to growing poverty and 
unemployment, and a loss of social cohesion in the fishing 
communities of South Africa’s Western Cape.  
This study concludes that a just, transparent and broadly 
acceptable process for allocating fishing rights, together with 
the empowerment of local people to make effective use of 
these rights, will be critical for both the protection of the fish 
stocks and the alleviation of poverty in South Africa’s Western 
Cape.  This policy brief focuses on the current allocation 
system, and how it could be improved through i) the greater 
involvement of local stakeholders and ii) the application of a 
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) approach to the 
provision of fishing rights.  The empowerment of fishers in the 
Western Cape is addressed in Policy Brief no. 7. 
.This policy brief is based on the PREM Working Paper, ‘Fishing rights and 
small-scale fishers: An evaluation of the rights allocation process and the utili-
sation of fishing rights in South Africa’ by Alison Joubert, Alison Gilbert,  
Jossette Matthee, Theodor Stewart, Ron Janssen, Linda de Vries, Leanne Scott 
and Marjan van Herwijnen. The full report is available online at:  
www.prem-online.org 
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Fishing rights allocation in South Africa’s  
Western Cape  
Fisheries resources are vulnerable to over-
exploitation, in large part because of their open-
access nature. For long-term ecological and 
socioeconomic sustainability, fisheries therefore 
need to be regulated by limiting Total Allowable 
Catches (TAC) and/or Total Allowable Effort (TAE). 
Deciding how rights to fish (and subsequent quotas) 
should be subdivided between fishers is an 
inherently complex task, made more challenging by 
South Africa’s socio-political context.  
In South Africa, the allocation of fishing rights is 
carried out by the Marine and Coastal Management 
Directorate (MCM) of the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism. The total TAC/
TAE for each fishery is allocated between various 
sectors (full commercial, limited commercial, 
recreational, subsistence etc.), and then to specific 
companies and individuals within these sectors. The 
most recent allocation system (2001-2004) focuses 
on ‘the need to balance the sustainability of the 
industry while enhancing the capacity of historically 
disadvantaged communities to establish 
commercially viable businesses’. Allocation is 
principally based on the following criteria (also see 
figure 1 for an example):  
• The degree of ‘transformation’, measured by 
the HDP status of the applicant and/or by the 
percentage of HDP ownership/management of 
the enterprise. 
• The degree of investment and involvement in 
the industry, measured by ownership of (or 
access to) a vessel, and in some cases, 
previous fishing rights. For some fisheries, 
evidence of a business plan for fishing 
operations (indicating both financial viability and 
‘business acumen’ of the fisher/company) is 
required. 
• Compliance with the Marine Living Resources 
Act, Customs and Excise and other relevant 
legislation. 
Figure 1: Criteria and weighted scores for the  
traditional linefish allocations in 2003.  
 
At present, there are serious inconsistencies and a 
lack of transparency in the allocation of fishing 
rights.  This has caused high levels of discontent 
(and may have enhanced illegal fishing) in the 
Western Cape, where fishers feel their access to 
rights remains constrained.  Disadvantaged 
communities in this region specifically seek greater 
access to hake handline, traditional linefish, west 
coast rock lobster and abalone stocks. These 
small-scale fisheries are particularly important for 
poorer fishers as they don’t require high capital 
investment. 
 
Issues facing policy-makers:  
• What is the nature of the present fishing 
rights allocation system in South Africa?  
• If given the opportunity, how would both 
local fisher communities in the Western 
Cape region and the Marine and Coastal 
Management Directorate (MCM) reform 
this system?  
• What would be an alternative approach to 
the allocation of fishing rights? 
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The fishing rights allocation system:  
stakeholder feedback  
Through a series of informal discussions and 
questionnaires, local fishing communities and the 
MCM were asked for their views on improving the 
allocation of fishing rights (See figure 2). Both 
fishers and the MCM thought that the industry 
needed to be transformed to provide greater 
stability, more equitable access and enhanced 
economic performance. However, there were 
differences in what the two groups meant by these 
concepts: 
• Stability: Communities were concerned 
primarily with social continuity: rights allocation 
should not disrupt traditional ways of life. The 
MCM’s concern was rather focused on the 
economic stability of the fishing industry. 
• Equitable access: Communities felt that 
people who were dependent on fishing for their 
livelihoods and who were bona fide fishers 
should receive rights. However, in the allocation 
process, the MCM focused instead on 
dependence on a single fishery. For seasonal 
fisheries, quotas are often too small to be 
economically viable (e.g. those for west coast 
rock lobster). Equally, fishers with traditional 
linefish rights may not hold rights of access to 
other fisheries and vice-versa. In the past, 
people with rights to west coast rock lobster and 
abalone stocks would often use the linefish 
permit so as to be active for the whole year. 
The MCM relies on fishers finding employment 
as crew on other vessels if they only have a 
single seasonal right themselves. Lastly, fishing 
communities generally felt that access to a 
vessel was more important than vessel 
ownership as a criterion to determine rights 
allocation; in some communities, only a few 
people owned vessels. Sharing of vessels 
would not only help prevent over-capacity, but 
would also improve the viability of small quotas. 
• Economic performance: Communities wanted 
historical or previous involvement in fishing to 
take greater precedence as a criterion in the 
allocation process. This should ensure greater 
stability of the fishing industry. Although past 
involvement can act as a proxy for fishers’ 
‘performance’ or ‘ability’, the MCM requires 
even small-scale fishers to demonstrate some 
business skills.  This is a consequence of an 
associated government goal: greater economic 
growth and development. Yet there seems to be 
no justifiable reason why a good fisher (and one 
who fishes within the law) need adopt a 
business-like approach. 
 
Figure 2: Weights derived for the three criteria used in 
the east of Cape Hangklip lobster allocation.   
As part of this project weights were derived with fishers 
from Hawston/Hermanus and Ocean View (left) and with 
MCM (middle) during separate workshops.  The weights 
used in the actual allocation are shown on the right.  The 
weights from the fisher and MCM workshops appear 
closer to each other than to those used in the allocation. 
 
 
Policy recommendations  
As effective fisheries management requires the 
support of fishers, it is critical that stakeholder 
feedback be taken into account when developing 
criteria and objectives for the new round of fishing 
rights allocations in 2005. South Africa’s Minister of 
Fisheries has already suggested that an initial 
allocation will be published for comment before 
final allocation decisions are made. This is a 
positive step forward. Yet, doing this well will 
require the development of an allocation system 
that can deal with the integration of multiple 
viewpoints and goals (as well as with more 
traditional resource economics). 
The use of Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis 
(MCDA) would help to achieve this, and its value 
has been recognized in fisheries management 
contexts internationally. MCDA provides structured 
decision-making support to policy-makers when 
informed trade-offs need to be made. An important 
feature of MCDA (and one which is often missing 
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PREM: In brief 
 
The Poverty Reduction and Environmental  
Management (PREM) programme aims to  
deepen and broaden the exposure of economic 
researchers and policy advisors in Africa and  
Asia to the theory and methods of natural  
resource management and environmental  
economics. It is anticipated that this will  
encourage policy changes that address both  
poverty reduction and sustainable  
environmental management.  
 
For further information about PREM, contact:  
Pieter van Beukering  
Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM)  
Vrije Universiteit 
De Boelelaan 1087 
1081HV Amsterdam  
The Netherlands 
Tel. +31(20)5989555/Fax. +31(20)5989553 
 
beukering@ivm.vu.nl 
www.prem-online.org 
www.vu.nl/ivm  
This policy brief is an output of a research project funded by PREM. The views expressed herein are not  
necessarily those of PREM or its sponsors. 
in fisheries management) is the establishment of 
clear objectives and the linking of criteria to these 
objectives. 
 
The current fishing rights allocation system used by 
the MCM can be described as a form of multi-
criteria analysis: the system is based on policy 
objectives such as ‘transformation’, and criteria 
linked to these objectives are scored. The MCM 
then evaluates applications on the basis of the sum 
of scores. However, there are flaws in this method. 
In particular, the link between policy objectives and 
criteria needs to be made more explicit and 
organised in a more consistent way. A new fishing 
rights allocation system would maintain the same 
overall structure as the current approach, but would 
be improved, for example, by applying scores to 
performance levels of criteria and weights to 
different criteria in a systematic manner. Ultimately, 
it is not realistic for all stakeholders to be entirely 
satisfied with any given fishing rights allocation 
approach; however, at least a transparent, fair and 
competent system would inspire more respect and 
trust. 
 
The MCM also needs to reflect on its multiple goals 
for South Africa’s fisheries. Within the boundaries of 
ecological sustainability, some fisheries need to be 
managed with poverty alleviation in mind and 
others for economic efficiency. Where poverty 
reduction is a principle objective, the requirement 
for fishers to have ‘business skills’ may be 
inappropriate (as already outlined).  
 
Certain fisheries management and rights allocation 
issues still remain to be addressed in South 
Africa’s Western Cape. These include determining 
the ‘minimum viable quota’ for small-scale fisheries 
and supporting alternative livelihood strategies 
where necessary. This is particularly important in 
seasonal fisheries, where fishers need other 
income-generating activities for part of the year. 
Sharing fishing rights within a community through 
reciprocal crewing arrangements is one means of 
doing this. However, communities need further 
assistance and advice from the MCM regarding 
how to put such schemes into practice. 
 
 
 
 
